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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the determinants and implications for financial stability of the mix of 
international banks’ claims countries receive. In particular, we distinguish between local 
claims, extended by international banks through their affiliates in a host (or claim recipient) 
country, and cross-border claims, booked from outside the host country, typically from 
banks’ headquarters in their home countries. Using data on US, Spanish, and Italian banks’ 
foreign claims across countries, we find that the share of local foreign claims is primarily 
driven by the degree of “freedom” in the host banking sector and by business opportunities in 
the local market. Entry requirements, startup and informational costs associated with 
international banking also play a role, but their influence is less robust. Finally, we find that the 
mix of international bank claims has implications for financial stability, since foreign claim 
volatility is lower in countries that receive a larger share of local claims. 
Keywords: foreign bank financing, financial FDI, cross-border claims. 
JEL: F36, F37, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
After a decade of financial repression and stagnant international financial flows, the 1990s 
saw a resurgence in financial globalization. Countries opened up their economies to 
capital flows and liberalized their financial sectors. As part of this process of financial 
integration, multinational banking gained momentum once again and international banks’ 
foreign claims –those extended on residents outside the country in which these banks are 
headquartered– took off. According to Bank for International Settlement statistics, which 
monitor foreign claims held by banks from OECD countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world, 
these claims rose from 1.3 trillion dollars in 1990 to close to 3 trillion dollars in 2002.1 In real 
terms, foreign claims to all non-BIS reporting countries rose by 120 percent over this period 
and claims to developing countries increased by 104 percent. These claims consist of 
financial assets such as loans, debt securities and equities, including equity participations in 
subsidiaries. 
International banks may grow their foreign claims portfolio in two ways. First, they 
may establish affiliates in different countries and extend claims locally through their branches 
and subsidiaries in these countries. Second, international banks may also extend 
cross-border claims by financing and booking the claims from outside the recipient or host 
countries (e.g., originating the claim in their home countries, where their headquarters are 
located). While the first type of international bank claims involve some form of foreign direct 
investment in the host country’s financial sector, cross-border claims do not. In practice, we 
observe significant disparities in how banks conduct their business across countries. In some 
instance, like in the case of Albania, Burundi, Bhutan, Cambodia, and Moldova, foreign banks 
extend only cross-border claims. While in other instances, such as in Brazil, Chile, and Hong 
Kong, foreign banks’ exposure is largely local. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the determinants of the mix of 
foreign bank claims and to study its implications for financial stability. In terms of determinants 
of the composition of foreign bank financing, we examine the role of entry requirements, 
startup and informational costs, government intervention in the financial sector (primarily in the 
form of taxes, and restrictions in bank entry and operations), and business opportunities 
across host countries. The empirical model we propose is a reduced form model which tries 
to capture the underlying preferences of foreign banks, as well as those of governments and 
private agents in the host countries in our sample.2 
With respect to the implications of the mix of foreign bank claims, we focus 
exclusively on the impact of the composition of these claims on the overall volatility of foreign 
bank financing.3 Because FDI or local claims require paying higher fixed and irreversible costs, 
it seems reasonable to expect these flows to be more stable and less responsive to bad news 
than cross-border claims. Also, economic fixed costs aside, banks trying to shrink the size or 
close down their overseas operations will have to pay the reputational costs of doing so and, 
therefore, may be less likely to run when conditions deteriorate. At the same time, while in the 
                                                                          
1. BIS-reporting countries over this period include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and US. 
2. Data limitations do not allow us to study the role of bank specific characteristics or home country variables. In other 
words, because we only have aggregate data for banks from three countries we cannot examine the impact of bank and 
home country characteristics on the share of local claims. 
3. There may be other implications from the mix of foreign bank claims, such as the impact on the balance of payments, 
which we ignore here and leave for future research. 
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face of good economic conditions, foreign banks can relatively quickly and, perhaps cheaply, 
extend cross-border financing, augmenting their local claims might require lumpy investments 
that are often decided on the basis of long-term rather than short-term profit opportunities. 
Even though the literature on international banking is quite vast, a limitation of 
existing studies is that the determinants of financial FDI (or local claims) and those driving 
cross-border claims have been considered largely in isolation.4 Furthermore, though some 
studies have documented differences in the behavior of international banks’ cross-border 
and local claims across countries [see Haas and Lelyveld (2002), for Eastern Europe, Peek 
and Rosengren (2000), for Latin America, and Palmer (2000) for US bank claims around the 
world], the implications of the compositions of foreign bank claims have been largely 
overlooked in the international banking literature and still require a systematic empirical 
analysis. 
The majority of existing papers on international or foreign banking have 
examined why international banks enter certain markets. An early strand of the 
literature on FDI by international banks focused on the experience of developed 
countries (especially the US) with foreign bank entry and bank internationalization during 
the 1970s and 1980s [e.g., Goldberg and Saunders (1980, 1981a and b), Ball and 
Tschoegl (1982), Nigh et al. (1986), Cho et al. (1987), Hultman and McGee (1989), Goldberg 
and Johnson (1990), Goldberg and Grosse (1994), Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), and 
Fisher and Molyneaux (1996)]. More recently, several authors have examined the 
decision of international banks to establish operations overseas during the 1990s, especially 
in developing countries [e.g., Buch (2000), Claessens et al. (2000), Focarelli and Pozzolo 
(2001 and 2006), Guillen and Tschoegl (2000), Buch and DeLong (2001) Moshirian (2001), 
Galindo, Micco and Serra (2003), Buch (2003), Buch and Lipponer (2004) and Wezel (2004).5 
At the same time, a smaller number of papers have examined the determinants and 
behavior of cross-border claims [e.g., Dahl and Shrieves (1999) Buch (2000), Jeanneau and 
Micu (2002), Kawai and Liu (2002), and Buch and Lipponer (2004)]. 
This paper assembles a database on foreign claims, both cross-border and local, 
extended by Italian, Spanish, and US banks to over 100 countries around the world during 
the period 1997-2002, to investigate the determinants of the share of local claims across 
countries and its implications for financial stability. Banks from Italy, Spain, and the United 
States are dominant players in the international banking market and they jointly account 
for approximately 30 percent of all outstanding foreign claims vis-à-vis the countries in our 
sample. 
In studying the mix of cross-border and local claims extended by international banks 
across countries, we rely on the conceptual/theoretical framework used in the 
trade/multinational firm literature to study the choice between exporting goods (the equivalent 
                                                                          
4. Buch and Lipponer (2004) is an exception. This study recognizes that banks have a choice to lend cross-border or to 
do so locally in host countries via their foreign affiliates. Using data for German banks, the authors test whether 
these two forms of financing are complements or substitutes by running regressions of one type of foreign funds 
vis-à-vis the other, while controlling for other determinants of international banking activities. They conclude that in 
the case of German banks both types of claims are complementary. The problem with their approach is that 
complementarity could be a result of endogeneity, where both types of foreign claims are driven by omitted factors. 
Also, the authors do not investigate why different countries get different shares of local claims relative to what they 
receive in cross-border flows. 
5. A growing literature has examined the implications of foreign bank presence in developing countries. See Clarke 
et al. (2003) for a review of this literature. Among others, Claessens et al. (2000), Barajas et al. (2000), Denizer (2000), 
and Martínez Pería and Mody (2004) discuss the implications on competition and efficiency in the banking sector. 
Dages et al. (2000), Detragiache and Gupta (2004), Peek and Rosengren (2000), de Haas and Levyveld (2002 and 2004) 
compare the lending behavior of foreign and domestic banks during crises. Berger et al. (2001), Mian (2004), and 
Clarke et al. (2005) address the consequences on access to financing by small businesses. 
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to cross-border lending) and producing them abroad for foreign markets (FDI). In particular, 
studies such as Brainard (1997) and Helpman et al. (2003) discuss the tradeoff faced by 
multinational firms between paying the higher sunk costs of establishing affiliates overseas 
vis-à-vis confronting the transportation costs and trade barriers that arise from exporting their 
goods instead. 
Following the trade literature, we investigate how the share of local claims to total 
foreign claims extended by international banks across countries is affected by the entry 
requirements and startup sunk costs of setting up operations overseas. These costs have 
been largely neglected in the literature on international banking. We use new survey data on 
the minimum capital requirements for opening banks across countries, as well as recently 
available information on the general costs (fees, costs of procedures and forms, fiscal stamps, 
legal and notary charges, etc.) of starting up a business to study their importance in driving 
the share of local to total foreign claims. 
Also, since banking is an informationally intensive industry, we reinterpret the role of 
variable transportation costs in the manufacturing trade/multinational firm literature 
as information costs that arise in the international banking context. However, contrary to 
the case of transportation costs, which have an unambiguously negative effect on the 
share of exports to FDI, the impact of informational costs on international banking is harder 
to measure and a priori unclear. On the one hand, there are the informational costs of 
screening and monitoring foreign clients, which tend to be higher the larger the “distance” 
(geographic, cultural, legal, etc) between the borrower and the bank [See Petersen and 
Rajan (1994 and 2002), Berger et al. (2002), and Bonaccorsi and Gobbi (2001)]. Because 
extending claims through overseas affiliates allows banks proximity to its foreign clients, local 
claims are expected to carry lower informational costs of screening and monitoring borrowers 
than cross-border claims. On the other hand, extending claims through overseas affiliates 
raises the costs of information and oversight faced by international banks’ CEOs and/or 
shareholders in trying to monitor the actions of managers and loan officers at these affiliates. 
In other words, extending claims through affiliates might increase information costs by 
augmenting the “distance” between bank CEOs, managers, and loan officers [Mian (2004)]. 
Thus, as a result, the net impact of information costs on the share of local claims is largely an 
empirical question, which we hope to address. 
Relative to information costs, the banking policies of the host country are expected 
to have a clearer impact on the share of local claims. Policies that limit cross-border activities 
such as capital controls on loans from abroad are anticipated to diminish this form of bank 
presence, in the same way that trade tariffs discourage trade. On the other hand, limits on 
“banking freedom” such as restrictions on bank activities and foreign bank entry; controls 
on foreign currency lending by banks operating in the local market; and high corporate taxes 
are expected to reduce the attractiveness for international banks of extending claims locally in 
a foreign country. 
There are a number of reasons why governments might put in place banking 
policies that promote one type of foreign bank claims or the other. First, by deterring foreign 
banks from freely operating locally in a host country, governments might seek to protect 
the domestic banking sector from foreign competition. Second, governments might promote 
certain types of foreign claims over others because of their different implications for the 
balance of payments. In particular, while cross-border financing virtually always implies 
obtaining foreign currency, in the case of local claims, beyond the initial FDI investments, the 
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local activity of foreign banks involves intermediating local savings. Third, as discussed above, 
governments might want to influence the type of foreign bank financing to the extent that this 
has an impact on volatility. 
Finally, consistent with what other international banking studies on FDI and 
cross-border claims have found, we allow for measures of economies of scale, profit 
opportunities, as well as, default, price and expropriation risks to influence the share of local 
to total foreign claims extended to a country. While some of these variables have a clear 
expected impact on the share of local claims, the effect of others on the mix of foreign 
financing is an empirical question. In our view, this makes our empirical investigation all the 
more interesting. 
Our results for the share of Italian, Spanish and US banks local claims indicate that 
this ratio is negatively impacted by restrictions on banks’ freedom to operate in the local 
market. On the other hand, larger economies of scale and business opportunities lead to 
more local foreign claims. Other factors such as entry bank requirements, startup and 
informational costs are also significant, but their impact is less consistent across international 
banks and also varies depending on the specifications. 
Regarding the implications of the mix of foreign bank claims for the stability of foreign 
financing, we find that countries with a higher share of local foreign claims observe lower total 
foreign claims volatility. This result, which is robust to controlling for a number of other factors 
that might affect foreign claims volatility, helps us confirm in a systematic manner some of the 
descriptive evidence offered by other studies favoring local foreign claims to cross-border 
bank financing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data on 
Italian, Spanish, and US foreign claims. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology 
pursued. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 The data on foreign claims 
Perhaps, one of the reasons why not much research exists on the mix of foreign claims 
extended by international banks across countries has to do with the fact that this data is not 
readily available. The main source of international banking data is the BIS. The BIS’ 
Consolidated Banking Statistics contain information on the foreign claims extended by 
international banks from more than 20, primarily OECD, countries (referred to as BIS-reporting 
countries). The data reported by the BIS aggregates the information provided by individual 
banks in each BIS reporting country, so it is really country level as opposed to bank level 
data. 
An important advantage of the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics is that they net 
out intrabank claims so, for example, loans between a bank’s headquarter and its branches 
and or subsidiaries overseas are not included. On the other hand, the BIS data does not 
adequately discriminate between cross-border and local foreign claims. While cross-border 
claims are mainly denominated in foreign currency, local claims can be denominated either in 
the local currency of the country where the claimholder resides or in a foreign currency. The 
latter is particularly true in the case of highly dollarized countries (such as many in Latin 
America). In general, BIS data on local claims only captures those denominated in local 
currency. Foreign currency denominated local claims are combined with cross-border claims 
and reported under what the BIS calls “international claims”. Thus, BIS data is largely ill-suited 
for an analysis of the determinants or the implications of the mix of cross-border versus local 
international bank claims. 
Due to the limitations of the existing BIS information, the data used in our analysis 
had to be specially requested, through the BIS, from the Italian and Spanish central banks. 
The exception was the US, which is the only country that since 1997 reports separate 
information on cross-border and local claims to the BIS. For all three countries, the data 
available to us aggregates claims held by all banks vis-à-vis each host country. Thus, like in 
the case of the BIS data, the information we have is not bank, but rather country level data. 
For the US, we have information for the period 1997-2002. In the case of Spain and Italy the 
data covers the period 1998-2002. None of these countries collected separate information on 
local and cross-border claims prior to this period. In the case of all three countries, the 
information we have nets intra-bank positions.6 
Table 1 presents information on Italian banks’ foreign claims in 105 countries. Claims 
are zero in 9 countries (Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Honduras, Niger, Papua 
New Guinea and Rwanda) and are 100 percent cross-border in 60 countries or 60 percent of 
the sample. Countries where Italian banks extend only cross-border claims include both 
developed and developing economies across all regions. 
Italian banks hold local claims in 35 percent of the countries in our sample. These 
include primarily developed economies or countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
However, among these countries, the share of local claims is never 100 percent (the largest 
share of local claims hovering around 90 percent is observed for countries such as Croatia, 
Poland, and Peru). This indicates that Italian banks do not substitute entirely local claims for 
                                                                          
6. This is an important advantage of this dataset since it allows us to measure net exposure to a country. Bank level data 
from sources such as Bankscope do not disclose information on intragroup positions and on cross-border lending to 
specific hosts. 
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cross-border lending. Even in countries where most of the banking business is conducted 
through the local affiliates, there is still some cross-border financing taking place. 
Table 2 shows information pertaining to the overseas or foreign claims of Spanish 
banks. Spanish banks are not active in anyway in 13 countries in the sample –Armenia, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Jamaica, Nepal, Lesotho, Nepal, Niger, 
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Zambia–, half of which are in Africa. Spanish banks hold exclusively 
cross-border claims vis-à-vis 48 countries or 47 percent of the sample. Like in the case of 
Italian banks, the list includes developed (mostly Nordic) and developing countries across all 
regions. Spanish banks tend to have local operations in developed countries and in emerging 
economies. The extent of local presence is particularly high in Latin America (especially 
Mexico and Bolivia) where in many countries the share of local presence exceeds 75 percent, 
but never reaches 100. 
As shown in Table 3, US banks appear to be active in one way or the other in all 
but 5 countries in our sample (i.e., Armenia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Madagascar, and 
Rwanda). Furthermore, contrary to the case of Spanish and Italian banks, US banks have 
some form of local presence in more than three-quarters of the sample and those countries 
where US claims are exclusively cross-border are mainly small developing economies (with 
the exception of Saudi Arabia). Finally, relative to Spain and Italy, it is harder to detect any 
regional pattern in the share of US bank local foreign claims, since countries with high shares 
include both developed and developing countries in almost every region. 
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3 Empirical Methodology  
The empirical analysis conducted in this paper has two objectives: (1) to study the 
determinants of the mix of foreign claims and (2) to examine the implications of this mix for 
the stability of foreign bank financing. Below, we discuss the empirical strategies pursued 
to accomplish these objectives. Because the time span covered by the data is relatively 
short and since many of the variables of interest do not vary over time, we focus on 
explaining differences across countries. Therefore, we consider only the average share of 
local foreign claims across countries and, for each country, the volatility of total foreign claims 
over the entire sample period. 
Taking into account the existing empirical international banking literature and 
borrowing from the theoretical framework used in related trade and multinational firm 
studies, we model the average share of local to total foreign claims held by Italian, Spanish, 
and US banks overseas as follows: 
Share of local foreign claimsi,j= β0 + β1Entry requirements & startup costsj +  
β2Informational costsi,j  + β3Bank Regulationj  + β4Taxesj +  
β5Scale & profit opportunitiesj  + β6Risksj + εi,j (1) 
where i indicates the international banks’ country of origin and j refers to the host or claim 
recipient country. We estimate separate cross-country equations for Italian, Spanish, and US 
banks’ foreign claims.7 In each of these equations, the Share of local foreign claims refers to 
the ratio of local foreign claims from i country banks to host country j out of the total foreign 
claims extended from i country banks to host country j. 
Equation (1) is a reduced form model that tries to capture the underlying preferences 
of foreign banks and of governments and private agents in the host countries. Unfortunately, 
because we only have aggregate data for foreign banks from three countries, we cannot 
examine the role of home country factors and the importance of certain bank specific 
characteristics. 
According to the trade/multinational firm literature, one of the main differences 
between exports and FDI, is that the latter involves paying sunk costs, typically associated 
with entry requirements and startup costs. Depending on their size, sunk costs can in 
principle be an important consideration for banks in deciding the type of presence to 
have in a country. If significant, we expect to find that sunk costs have an adverse effect on 
the share of local claims held by foreign banks. Obviously, measuring sunk costs is difficult. 
In the trade literature, these have often been captured by country fixed effects. However, this 
cannot be applied to a cross-section analysis such as ours. Furthermore, many other 
characteristics of a country not necessarily related to sunk costs may be captured by the 
fixed effects. 
                                                                          
7. A panel estimation would not add much information given the very small number of home countries for which this 
data is available. In addition, cross-country equations allow us to compare the results obtained for each home country 
and for each regressor. 
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In our study, we interpret sunk costs as the costs associated with entering the 
market and starting up a business. We include two separate measures of these costs. Our 
first measure controls for the minimum capital requirements banks need to comply with 
to begin operations in the countries in our sample. These data comes from a worldwide 
survey of bank regulators summarized by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). We use data on 
the actual monetary amount of capital (expressed in US dollars) banks have to put down and 
we also take into account the regulations in each country as to what may constitute bank 
capital. In particular, we build an index of initial capital stringency that can take values from 0 
to 3, with higher number indicating greater stringency. This index comes from summing up 
responses to the questions below in the following way: 
(1) Can initial and subsequent infusions of regulatory capital include assets other than 
cash or government securities? 1 if no. 
(2) Can the initial infusion of capital be based on borrowed funds? 1 if no. 
(3) Are the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital verified by the 
regulatory or supervisory authorities? 1 if yes. 
Finally, we combine the dollar measure with the index of initial capital stringency by 
obtaining the principal component of the two series. We refer to the first principal component 
of the two series as Minimum capital requirements.8 
Our second measure of entry and startup costs, tries to capture the actual number 
of procedures, time, and costs to initiate operations in a country. Data on the procedures 
required to open banks across countries come from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001). They 
construct an index of bank entry requirements that takes values from 0 to 8 depending on 
whether banks are required to submit none, some, or all of the following to issue a bank 
license: 
(1) Draft by-laws. 
(2) Intended organizational chart. 
(3) First 3-year financial projections. 
(4) Financial information on main potential shareholders. 
(5) Background/experience of future directors. 
(6) Background/experience of future managers. 
(7) Sources of funds to be used to capitalize the new bank. 
(8) Intended differentiation of new bank from other banks. 
                                                                          
8. It should be noted that cross-border lending also requires capital for the head office and that it will generally be higher 
for more vulnerable host countries, for the same loan size. While the two needs (the minimum capital requirement to 
operate locally and the capital needed for cross-border lending) are not easily comparable, minimum capital 
requirements should generally involve larger costs when a bank starts to operate locally. 
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This index is combined using the method of principal components with two other 
measures of the costs of starting a business that come from the World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators. In particular, we include survey estimates of the actual monetary costs (in dollars) 
and, separately, the time (in number of days) involved in opening a business across countries. 
The first measures all identifiable official expenses in setting up any business (not necessarily 
banking), namely fees, costs of procedures and forms, fiscal stamps, legal and notary 
charges, etc.9 The second, the time variable, captures the number of days to satisfy all 
procedures that need to be completed before a business license is issued. We refer to the 
first principal component of the entry bank requirement index, the costs, and time to start a 
business as Non-capital entry requirements and start up costs. 
In the export vs. FDI literature, the higher sunk costs involved in the latter are traded 
off against the higher transport costs involved in the former. In banking, physical 
transportation costs are not likely to be as important. Instead, the literature has discussed 
the role of informational costs [see for example Buch (2003) and Galindo et al. (2003)]. There 
are two main types of informational costs in the international banking business. On the one 
hand, there are the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers. These costs will tend to 
increase the larger the distance between the bank and its customers. On the other hand, 
there are the costs to banks’ CEO and shareholders of monitoring the affiliates’ managers 
and loan officers on the ground. These costs will also increase the larger the distance 
between the CEO and the manager/loan officer. Therefore, in extending bank claims 
overseas, the informational costs of monitoring borrowers decline when banks decide to 
extend claims locally to foreign countries via their affiliates in these countries. But, at the same 
time, by growing the share of foreign claims they extend locally, international banks increase 
the costs of monitoring loan officers and affiliate managers. Thus, the net impact of 
informational costs on the share of local lending is an empirical question. 
Testing the importance of informational costs in international banking decisions is 
complicated further by the fact that these cannot be measured directly. Instead, they are 
often captured by indicators of geographic, cultural, legal and economic “distance” between 
countries that are expected to affect information costs. As distance between an international 
bank and a country increases, both, the costs of monitoring foreign clients and bank 
managers or loan officers in bank affiliates rise. The discussion above suggests that the 
distance between the bank and its customers increases the comparative advantage to 
international banks of extending claims locally, since local presence helps to overcome some 
of these informational costs. Therefore, on the basis of the costs of monitoring borrowers, 
distance measures should have a positive impact on the share of local claims. On the other 
hand, as distance measures increase, the rising costs of monitoring loan officers and affiliate 
managers suggest that distance might have a negative impact on the share of local claims. 
Thus, a priori the sign of distance measures on the share of local claims is unclear. 
We control for the geographic distance between the foreign banks’ country of 
origin and the host country by including the log of the miles between the two countries’ 
capital cities. This information comes primarily from Glick and Rose (2002) and the Central 
                                                                          
9. As stated in the Doing Business Report “the text of the Company Law, the Commercial Code, and specific regulations 
and fee schedules are used to calculate the costs [of starting a business]. If there are conflicting sources and the laws 
are not clear, the most authoritative source is used. The constitution supersedes the company law, and the law prevails 
over regulations and decrees. If conflicting sources are of the same rank, the source indicating the most costly 
procedure is used, since an entrepreneur never second-guesses a government official. In the absence of fee schedules, 
a governmental officer’s estimate is taken as an official source. In the absence of a government officer's estimates, 
estimates of incorporation lawyers are used. If several incorporation lawyers provide different estimates, the median 
reported value is applied. In all cases, the cost excludes bribes.” A list of all procedures considered in estimating the 
costs of starting a business can be found in: 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/DoingBusiness/Methodology/StartingBusiness/StartingBusiness.pdf 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook.10 We also take into account that, nowadays, 
instant methods of communications like phones and internet connections can help bridge 
physical distances, making project and management oversight and access to information 
possible from far away places. In our regressions, we use the number of internet hosts 
per 1000 people in each borrowing/claim recipient country as measures of access to 
communications, which are like to affect monitoring and informational costs.11 These data 
come from the World Bank World Development Indicators. We expect that lending 
cross-border is easier to countries with better communications, allowing project monitoring 
and information gathering to be done “offsite”. Thus, we foresee that this variable will have a 
negative impact on the share of local to total foreign claims. 
We measure “economic” proximity between the home and the host country by 
including a measure of bilateral trade between these economies. This information comes 
from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.12 Finally, we measure home-host country “cultural” 
and “institutional” distance by including, respectively, a dummy that equals one if countries 
share a common language with the lender country and a dummy that equals one if countries 
have a common legal origin (which will then result in similar institutions). Data on common 
language and legal origin come from Glick and Rose (2002) and the CIA World Factbook. 
Government intervention in a country’s financial sector via regulations and/or taxation 
might affect the share of local to total foreign claims countries receive in different ways, 
depending on the kind of intervention. For example, controls on cross-border activity will 
negatively affect the level of cross-border claims and, therefore, will increase the share of local 
claims. Similarly, restriction on on-shore foreign currency lending, might also lead to a rise in 
cross-border claims to the degree that banks prefer to extend claims in foreign currencies. On 
the other hand, limits on “banking freedom”, in particular restrictions on bank activities and 
controls that affect foreign entry and foreign ownership of banks, will have the opposite effect. 
In our estimations, we control for regulations affecting the volume of cross-border 
and local claims, respectively. First, we include a dummy that equals one if the country has 
controls on cross-border financial credits. Second, we control for restrictions on on-shore 
foreign currency lending by including a dummy for the countries where such restrictions are in 
place. Data for both variables come from the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Restrictions. Third, in order to control for restrictions on bank activities and on financial 
FDI, we include the Index of Banking Freedom produced by the Heritage Foundation. This 
index takes into account the extent of restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open 
branches and/or subsidiaries, how heavily regulated the financial system is, the presence of 
state-owned banks, whether the government influences the allocation of credit, and whether 
banks are free to offer all types of financial services. This index takes values from 1 to 5, 
where higher values represent less freedom in the banking sector. 
Bank profits arising from cross-border activities are taxed at the rate prevalent in 
the banks’ country of origin, while taxes on their FDI activities or local claims depend on the 
hosts’ tax rates. Other things equal, we expect to find relatively lower levels of FDI activity or a 
lower share of local claims in countries with higher corporate taxes. In our study, taxes refer to 
                                                                          
10. When data was missing from this source, we used a software provided on the US Department of Agriculture 
webpage that calculates distances between more than 220 capital cities worldwide. 
(See http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/capitals.htm). 
11. In estimations that we do not report here, we also included measures of the number of phone lines in each claim 
recipient country. The results are not significantly different. Therefore, to save space we only report results using the 
number of internet hosts. 
12. Ideally, we would have liked to control as well for the share of non-financial FDI from the home to the host country, 
however, this information was missing for many of the countries in our sample. 
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the top corporate income taxes in each country as reported by the Heritage Foundation. 
Ideally, we would have also liked to control for taxes on financial intermediation, but such data 
is not available on a cross-country basis. 
Studies on both, cross-border claims and financial FDI, document that economies of 
scale, profit opportunities, and risks might also affect banks’ decisions to expand 
internationally. Thus, the degree to which each of these factors might affect the share of local 
claims is an empirical question. However, a priori we could speculate that since the returns 
from cross-border lending are limited to the initial claims extended plus an interest rate, while 
extending local claims often implies an equity participation in a local affiliate (bringing the 
potential for unbounded gains and losses13) scale economies, profit opportunities, and risks 
might be more important in driving FDI or local claims relative to cross-border loans. 
Following existing international banking studies, we capture the potential for scale 
economies and profit opportunities in two ways. First, we include the log of constant dollar 
GDP. Second, we include the growth of GDP as a measure of growth opportunities in the 
country. Economic growth may also be interpreted as a measure of default risk, since in 
countries that do not grow, borrowers might have a harder time repaying their obligations to 
banks. Data on both of these variables come from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators or the IMF International Financial Statistics, depending on the country. 
In international banking, pricing risks materialize when the value of the claims or 
return on the claims held by foreign banks declines as a result of exchange rate or other price 
changes. We measure price risk by controlling for inflation in our estimations.14 Data on 
inflation comes from the World Development Indicators. 
While both cross-border and local foreign claims are exposed to price and default 
risks, local claims are also subject to expropriation risks. We capture the extent of 
expropriation risks by including a measure of property rights in the host countries. This 
measure is an index compiled by the Heritage Foundation and reported as part of the Index of 
Economic Freedom. Higher levels of this index indicate worse property rights in the country. 
In some estimations, we replace the measure of default, price, and expropriation risks for one 
composite country risk measure as collected by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
in its country risk index.15 
We estimate the following equation to investigate the implications for financial 
stability of the mix (cross-border versus local) of foreign claims: 
Foreign claims volatilityi,j=γ0 + γ1Share of local claimsi,j + γ2Growth volatility,j + γ3Price 
volatilityj + γ4Volatility of claims to other countriesi,j + γ5Banking crisis indicatorj + μi,j (2) 
where, as before, i indicates the lender or home country and j refers to the host or borrowing 
country. Once again, we estimate separate cross-country equations for Italian, Spanish 
and US bank claims. In each of these equations, Foreign claims volatility refers to the 
standard deviation of i country banks’ total foreign claims vis-à-vis country j over the sample 
period divided by the average level of foreign claims to that country. 
                                                                          
13. This might be different for branches and subsidiaries due to the financial independence but also differences exist 
depending on the banks’ country of origin. 
14. Results remain unchanged if we used the change in the exchange rate instead. 
15. This index is defined by ICRG so that higher values mean less risk, but in our estimations we reverse the sign on this 
variable to give it the more intuitive interpretation that higher values mean more risk. 
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 The purpose of estimating equation (2) is to uncover whether, as some have argued 
[see de Haas and Levyled (2002), Peek and Rosengren (2000), and Palmer (2000)], the 
volatility of foreign claims is lower for countries where foreign claims are predominantly local 
(i.e., extended through the overseas affiliates of international banks). Thus, we are primarily 
interested in the coefficient on the share of local claims. However, in order to obtain 
consistent estimates of this coefficient, it is important to adequately control for other factors 
that might influence the volatility of foreign claims. Specifically, we control for the volatility of 
growth and inflation in the host economy, for whether the host country experienced a banking 
crisis over the period of study, and for the volatility of foreign claims to countries other than j. 
Growth and inflation volatilities are captured by the standard deviation of GDP 
growth and inflation in the host countries over the entire period of study. In some estimations, 
we replace these variables for the composite ICRG country risk index. The crisis indicator is a 
dummy, which equals one for those host countries that experienced a banking crisis over the 
period of study [see Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)]. The variable labeled volatility of claims to 
other countries is the standard deviation of claims from banks from country i to countries 
other than host j divided by the average level of foreign claims to countries other than j. The 
idea behind this variable is that the volatility of claims to a specific host might be influenced by 
what foreign banks do and experience in other host countries or even in their home countries 
(which affect all hosts simultaneously). 
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4 Empirical Results 
We first discuss our results on the determinants of the mix of foreign bank claims across 
countries and then proceed to present our findings regarding the volatility of total foreign 
claims. A detailed list and explanation of all the variables included in our empirical models is 
presented in Table 4. 
Because in many cases the share of local claims is zero, we report Tobit estimations 
to take into account the censoring that occurs at zero. In other words, we assume that the 
underlying dependent variable is a latent variable, which measures the desired share of local 
claims that banks would like to hold. As a result, the observed share is above zero only when 
this latent variable is above a certain threshold.16 
Table 5 presents the result from six specifications, two for each country. In particular, 
the first three columns report results for Italian, Spanish and US banks, controlling for 
minimum capital requirements. Because this information is missing for a number of countries, 
we also report estimations excluding this variable, as shown on the last three columns of 
Table 5. 
A number of interesting results emerge from the estimations shown in Table 5. First, 
lack of freedom for banks to operate in a host country has a significant negative impact on 
the willingness of foreign banks to extend local claims. A standard deviation change in this 
variable leads to at least a 0.7, 0.5 and 0.35 standard deviation reduction in the share of 
Italian, Spanish, and US bank local foreign claims, respectively. Other forms of government 
intervention in the economy, such as restrictions on foreign credits or the level of taxation, are 
only significant for Spanish and Italian banks, respectively. 
Second, scale economies and profit opportunities, as captured primarily by the 
size of the country, have a consistently positive impact on the share of local claims. Foreign 
banks are more willing to extend claims locally where the potential for business is larger. In 
small countries, banks might not be willing to establish local operations, which involve 
paying fixed cost of entry and operations, given that the potential for business is limited. 
A one standard deviation change in the log of constant dollar GDP leads to at least a 1.8, 1.2, 
and 0.7 standard deviation change in the share of Italian, Spanish, and US bank local foreign 
claims, respectively. 
Third, controlling for size, minimum capital requirements and other entry costs are 
also important determinants of the share of local claims, but less consistently so than the 
other factors mentioned so far. Minimum capital requirements have a negative impact on 
the share of local claims held by Spanish banks, while non-capital entry startup costs seem 
to affect US banks’ share of local claims. A one standard deviation change in minimum 
capital requirements leads to a 0.35 standard deviation decline in Spanish banks’ share of 
local claims. A one standard deviation change in entry costs results in a 0.2 standard 
deviation drop in US banks’ share of local claims. 
                                                                          
16. We also tried to estimate a Heckman model to take into account the possibility of selection bias, but estimations did 
not converge because there are two few cases when total claims are 0 (i.e., when the share of local claims is not 
observed). 
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Fourth, informational costs matter, since several of the variables included to proxy for 
these costs are found to be significant. Better means of communications (as proxied by the 
number of internet hosts) have a negative impact on the share of local claims across all 
banks, suggesting that access to communications may lessen the need for local operations 
and increase banks’ willingness to conduct more of their business cross-border. A one 
standard deviation change in the number of internet hosts per 1,000 people, results in at the 
least a 0.6, 0.2, and a 0.35 standard deviation change in the share of local claims from Italian, 
Spanish, and US banks, respectively. On the other hand, controlling for access to 
communications, geographic distance has a negative impact on the share of local claims, 
signifying perhaps that banks feel that their ability to monitor local operations is adversely 
affected by distance. However, this is true only for Italian and Spanish banks, maybe because 
US banks’ governance structure or greater experience in international banking allows them to 
view distance as less of an obstacle. 
Cultural and institutional affinity is especially important for both Spanish and US 
banks, since we find that having a common language in the case of Spanish banks 
and sharing the same legal origin both for Spanish and US banks has a positive impact 
on the share of local claims. The share of Spanish banks’ local claims is approximately 
63 percentage points higher in Spanish speaking countries, relative to those where Spanish is 
not the local language. For countries with a common legal origin with the US, the share of US 
banks’ local claims is up to 18 percentage points higher than the rest. 
Fifth, economic and expropriation risks do not seem to affect the mix of foreign bank 
claims, once we control for other factors. This does not necessarily mean that banks do not 
pay attention to these factors. It might be that these factors affect both cross-border and 
local claims in similar ways, making their impact on the ratio statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. Also, it is worthwhile pointing out that there is a significant correlation between country 
size and property right protection, which might cause the latter to be insignificant in our 
sample. 
To verify the robustness of the results reported so far, Table 6 presents a number of 
additional estimations. In particular, in the first three columns of Table 6 we substitute the 
measure of lack of banking freedom for a more direct measure of restrictions on foreign 
bank entry, as measured by the actual percentage of foreign bank applications denied. 
This data come from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001). The number of countries for which this 
information is available is smaller than in our previous estimations. This might explain why 
this variable is significant for Italian and Spanish banks, but not for US banks. 
In columns (3)-(6) of Table 6, we present estimations where real GDP growth, 
inflation and property rights, treated so far as measures of default, price and expropriation 
risks, respectively, are replaced by one composite country risk measure. As with the individual 
measures, we find that risks do not seem to consistently affect the mix of foreign bank claims. 
Finally, the last three columns in Table 6 show results controlling for the total level of 
foreign bank claims each country receives. These estimations try to address the point that 
perhaps local presence is larger in countries where banks are willing to have a larger 
exposure. We find no consistent evidence of this. 
Our second set of results, reported on Tables 7 through 9, examine the implications 
of the mix of local versus cross-border foreign claims for the stability of foreign bank financing 
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across countries. In each table, we include seven different specifications from least to most 
general. In the first column of each table, we include only the variable of interest: the share of 
local to total foreign claims.17 The remaining columns include other controls that might also 
affect total foreign bank claims volatility. In particular, we control for price and output volatility, 
the level of financial sector development (as proxied by the ratio of private credit to GDP), and 
the behavior of foreign claims vis-à-vis other countries. Furthermore, in some estimations, we 
include a composite measure of country risk. 
Table 7 presents the results for Italian banks. The share of local claims has a 
consistently negative impact on the volatility of foreign bank claims, no matter what other 
variables are included in the regression. On average, a one standard deviation change in the 
share of Italian banks’ local claims would result in a 0.19 standard deviation change in 
the volatility of Italian banks’ total claims. In some estimations, the volatility of Italian banks’ 
foreign claims is also impacted by the volatility of prices, the level of development of the 
local financial sector, and the composite measure of country risk in the host countries. 
Results for the volatility of Spanish bank foreign claims are shown on Table 8. Here 
too, we find that the share of local claims seems to be associated with lower foreign bank 
claims volatility. A one standard deviation change in the share of local Spanish banks’ claims 
would result in a 0.24 standard deviation change in the volatility of total Spanish banks’ 
claims. In the case of Spain, there is also evidence that output volatility in the host country 
contributes to foreign bank lending volatility or procyclicality. 
The negative relationship between the volatility of foreign bank claims and the 
composition of these claims is further supported by the results for US banks. Once again, 
we find that the volatility of foreign bank claims is lower in countries where banks’ exposure 
to the country is primarily in the form of local claims. A one standard deviation change in US 
banks’ share of local claims would result in a 0.45 standard deviation change in the volatility 
of US banks’ total foreign claims. As in the case of Spanish banks, US bank volatility seems 
to be higher for countries with large output volatility and less developed financial sectors. 
                                                                          
17. We treat as outliers and, therefore, we exclude from the regressions cases where the volatility of the share was very 
high due to some unusual event or transaction. This meant dropping Croatia, Poland, and the Slovak republic from our 
sample of countries in the estimates for Italian banks, since these countries experienced an abrupt change in the share 
of local Italian claims due to mergers and acquisitions. 
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5 Conclusions 
While a vast literature exists analyzing the cross-border and local activities of multinational 
banks across countries, the determinants and implications of the mix of international bank 
claims had not, to our knowledge, been explored before. Using data on the Italian, Spanish, 
and US bank claims vis-à-vis more than 100 countries, this paper sought to fill this void in the 
multinational banking literature. 
First, we estimated a reduced form empirical model of the share of local to total 
foreign claims across host countries. In particular, we modeled the share of local to 
total foreign claims as a function of entry requirements and startup costs, informational costs, 
regulatory barriers to banking activities and foreign bank participation (or what we call lack of 
banking freedom), taxation, as well as profit opportunities and risks. We found that regulatory 
barriers to banking and measures of business opportunities and scale economies have the 
most consistently significant impact on the share of local bank claims. This share is smaller in 
countries that limit banking freedom. On the other hand, the share of local foreign bank claims 
tends to be higher in larger countries with better business opportunities. Entry requirements 
and startup costs, as well as informational costs, also seem to be important determinants of 
the share of local claims, but their impact is smaller and less robust. 
Second, we presented evidence that the mix or composition of foreign bank 
financing affects the stability of foreign bank claims to host countries. Countries where a 
larger share of foreign claims is extended through the local affiliates of foreign banks, rather 
than through cross-border loans, tend to enjoy more stable foreign financing. 
Our findings suggest that in order to reduce the volatility of foreign bank financing, 
countries should try to increase the share of foreign claims channeled through the local 
affiliates of foreign banks in their countries. According to our results on the determinants of 
the share of local presence, host countries can influence this share by lowering regulatory 
barriers to bank activities and foreign bank participation and by improving business 
opportunities in their market. 
While this study is, to our knowledge, the first to examine the determinants and 
implications of the mix of foreign bank claims, the analysis conducted is not without 
limitations. In particular, the time series analyzed is short and the number of home countries 
considered is small. Thus, it would be important that as more data becomes available, further 
research is conducted to verify the robustness of our results over more comprehensive 
datasets. Also, it should be noted that the mix of local versus cross-border foreign financing 
may have a bearing on questions other than financial stability, which host countries may 
consider important. For example, host countries may be concerned about the type of 
financing received, because of its balance of payment needs. Exploring these alternative 
implications from the mix of foreign bank claims is also left for future research. 
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Table 1: Italian banks' foreign claims vis-à-vis other countries
No presence Only cross border
0.1%-25% 25%-50% 50%-75% >75%
Bhutan Albania Slovenia China Singapore Japan
Botswana Algeria Austria Chile Canada Brazil
Burkina Faso Armenia Netherlands UnitedKingdom Colombia Hungary
Burundi Australia Turkey Lebanon Argentina Slovak Rep.
Cambodia Bangladesh Ukraine France Hong Kong Croatia
Honduras Belarus Czech Rep. United Arab Emirates Poland
Niger Bolivia Israel Bulgaria Paraguay
Papua Congo Greece Spain Peru
Rwanda Costa Rica Belgium United States
Cote d'Ivoire Ireland
Ecuador Switzerland
Egypt Panama
El Salvador Germany
Estonia Romania
Finland
Ghana
Guatemala
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea
Kuwait
Latvia
Lesotho
Lithuania
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Moldova
Morocco
Namibia
Nepal
New D11Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
Russia
SaudiArabia
Senegal
SouthAfrica
SriLanka
Sweden
Sweden
Taiwan
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Venezuela
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Share of local claims (% of total foreign claims)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0525 
Table 2: Spanish banks' foreign claims vis-à-vis other countries
No presence Only cross border 0.1%-25% 25%-50% 50%-75% >75%
Armenia Albania Poland Switzerland Czech Rep. Colombia
Bangladesh Algeria Australia Morocco United States Argentina
Bhutan Belarus China France Philippines Hong Kong
Botswana Bulgaria Turkey Italy India Portugal
Burundi Congo Korea Panama Brazil
Cambodia Cote d'Ivoire Netherlands Chile
Jamaica Croatia Russia Peru
Lesotho Egypt Ecuador Paraguay
Nepal Estonia Austria Venezuela
Niger Finland South Africa Mexico
Rwanda Ghana CostaRica Bolivia
SriLanka Guatemala Canada
Zambia Indonesia Greece
Israel Singapore
Jordan Honduras
Kazakhstan Ireland
Kenya Hungary
Kuwait Japan
Lebanon Belgium
Lithuania El Salvador
Madagascar Germany
Malawi United Kingdom
Malaysia
Mali
Moldova
Namibia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Papua
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
Taiwan
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Vietnam
Zimbabwe
Share of local claims (% of total foreign claims)
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Table 3: U.S. banks' foreign claims vis-à-vis other countries
No presence Only cross border 0.1%-25% 25%-50% 50%-75% >75%
Armenia Albania Kuwait CostaRica Mexico Singapore
Burkina Faso Belarus Slovenia Germany Lebanon Cote d' Ivoire
Burundi Bhutan Ghana Morocco Brazil Taiwan
Madagascar Botswana Austria China Romania Pakistan
Rwanda Cambodia Zimbabwe Oman Nigeria Senegal
Congo Finland Indonesia Panama Malaysia
Croatia Netherlands Peru Hungary Paraguay
Estonia Malawi Colombia Greece Zambia
Latvia Norway South Africa Korea
Lithuania Sweden Bolivia Argentina
Mali Sweden Algeria Philippines
Moldova Israel Jamaica Slovak Republic
Namibia Ecuador Spain New Zealand
Nepal France Kazakhstan Chile
Nicaragua Bulgaria Japan
Niger Honduras Egypt
Saudi Arabia Guatemala Jordan
Togo Switzerland Bangladesh
Venezuela Canada
Italy Kenya
Russia SriLanka
Ireland Papua
Turkey Vietnam
Portugal Poland
El Salvador Thailand
Ukraine United Arab Emirates
Belgium Tunisia
India
Australia
Czech Republic
Hong Kong
Share of local claims (% of total foreign claims)
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Variable Name Definition Source
Banks' share of local to total foreign 
claims vis-à-vis host (claim recipient) 
country j.                             
Banks' local claims vis-à-vis host j divided by banks' total foreign 
claims to that host. (Constructed separately for Italian, Spanish, and 
U.S. banks)
Consolidated Banking Statistics (BIS), 
the Italian, and Spanish central banks.
Banks' foreign claims volatility vis-à-
vis host (claim recipient) country j.        
Standard deviation of foreign claims vis-à-vis host j divided by the 
average foreign claims to that host. (Constructed separately for 
Italian, Spanish, and U.S. banks)
Consolidated Banking Statistics (BIS), 
the Italian, and Spanish central banks.
Minimum capital requirements First principal component of (1) dollar capital requirements to start 
a bank and (2) an index of initial capital stringency which varies 
between 0 and 3 depending on whether the country (a) prohibits 
capital in forms other than cash or government paper, (b) prohibits 
the use of borrowed funds, and (c) verifies the sources of capital. 
Larger values indicate greater stringency.
Regulatory survey summarized in Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2001)
Non-capital entry requirements              
and startup costs
First principal component of (1) index of entry bank requirements a 
la Barth et al. (2001), (2) all identifiable official expenses in setting 
up a business (fees, costs of procedures and forms, fiscal stamps, 
legal and notary charges, etc.) from Doing Business Indicators 
(World Bank) and (3) time it takes to start up a business from the 
same source.
World Bank Doing Business Report
Bilateral distance Log of the distance in miles from a host (claim recipient) country's 
capital to the banks' country of origin. Constructed separately for 
Italy, Spain, and the U.S., respectively.
Glick and Rose (2002) and World 
Factbook  (CIA).
Bilateral trade Share of exports plus imports between a host (claim recipient) 
country and the banks'  country of origin (home) relative to home 
GDP. Constructed separately for Italy, Spain and the U.S.                 
 Export and import data are from 
Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF). 
GDP is from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank).    
Common language Dummy equal to 1 if the host (or claim recipient country) and home 
country (Italy, Spain, and U.S., respectively) speak the same 
language.
World Factbook  (CIA)
Common legal origin Dummy equal to 1 if the host (or claim recipient country) and home 
country (Italy, Spain, and U.S., respectively) share the same legal 
origin.
World Factbook  (CIA)
Internet hosts Internet hosts per 1000 people in host or claim recipient country. World Development Indicators      
(World Bank)
Log of GDP Logarithm of constant dollars GDP. World Development Indicators (World 
Bank)
Corporate tax rate Top corporate tax rate. Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage 
Foundation)
Restriction on foreign credits Dummy variable that equals one if there are any restrictions on non-
resident lending to residents (i.e., cross-border loans).  
Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (IMF)
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Table 4: Definition and sources for the variables used 
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Variable Name Definition Source
Lack of banking freedom An index from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating the fewest controls.  
Index measures the following factors: (1) government 
ownership of banks (2) restrictions on the ability of foreign 
banks to open branches and subsidiaries (3) government 
influence over the allocation of credit (4) government 
regulations (5)  restrictions on bank activities.
Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation)
Proportion of foreign bank applications 
denied
Percentage of requests by foreign banks to start operations 
that were rejected out of total applications received.
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001)
Restrictions on foreign currency lending Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country restricts 
foreign currency lending in the local banking sector.
Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (IMF)
Inflation Change in host (claim recipient) country GDP deflator.         World Development Indicators 
(World Bank)
GDP growth  Host (claim recipient) GDP growth (annual percentage). World Development Indicators 
(World Bank)
Property rights Index of Property Rights from 1 to 5 with 1 being the 
highest level of protection.  The index considers (1) freedom
from government influence over the judicial system, (2) 
commerical code defining contracts, (3) sanctioning of 
foreign arbitration, (4) government expropriation, (5) delays 
in the judicial system, (6) legally granted and protected 
property. 
Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage Foundation)
Country risk An index from 1 to 100 that is the composite of twelve 
variables measuring political, economic and financial risk.  
Higher values indicate more risk.
International Country Risk Guide
Inflation volatility The standard deviation of the change in host (claim 
recipient) GDP deflator. 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank)
Real growth volatility The standard deviation of host (claim recipient) GDP 
growth.
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank)
Private credit to GDP Bank claims on the private sector in current local currency 
over local currency GDP.
 International Financial Statistics 
(IMF)
Bank crisis Dummy variable that equals one if the host experienced a 
bank crisis between 1995 and 2002.
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)
Volatility of banks' claims to other 
countries
Standard deviation of all banks' foreign claims to countries 
other than j divided by the average claims to countries other 
than host j.
Consolidated Banking Statistics 
(BIS), Italian and Spanish central 
banks.
Independent variables
Table 4: Definition and sources for the variables used (cont'd)
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Table 5: Determinants of the share of local to total foreign claims
Tobit regressions for the share of Italian, Spanish, and U.S. banks' local claims, respectively, vis-à-vis 
a given host (claim recipient country), divided by their total claims to that host. t -statistics are in brackets.
 *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Variables
Italian 
banks
Spanish 
banks
U.S.    
banks
Italian 
banks
Spanish 
banks
U.S.     
banks
Minimum capital requirements 10.692 -9.631 -0.706
[1.48] [2.08]** [0.23]
Non-capital entry req. & startup costs -4.002 4.448 -5.472 -3.65 2.397 -6.561
[0.62] [0.94] [1.84]* [0.58] [0.50] [2.38]**
Bilateral distance -16.357 -15.253 9.129 -20.187 -13.46 4.025
[2.21]** [2.03]** [1.02] [2.76]*** [1.95]* [0.52]
Bilateral trade -12.433 -5.143 2.201 -10.304 -3.654 1.736
[1.73]* [1.17] [0.30] [1.38] [0.79] [0.24]
Common language 62.74 4.535 76.095 0.964
[3.47]*** [0.67] [4.64]*** [0.14]
Common legal origin 0.376 20.901 12.865 0.345 24.258 18.526
[0.03] [1.93]* [1.52] [0.02] [2.15]** [2.38]**
Number of internet hosts -0.199 -0.121 -0.064 -0.09 -0.029 -0.072
[2.29]** [1.87]* [2.54]** [1.79]* [0.84] [2.83]***
Log of GDP 28.27 19.046 10.293 29.062 21.217 10.644
[3.94]*** [3.67]*** [4.15]*** [3.75]*** [4.13]*** [4.60]***
Corporate tax rate -1.409 -0.321 -0.57 -2.145 -0.562 -0.56
[1.72]* [0.52] [1.45] [2.59]** [0.87] [1.45]
Restrictions on foreign credits 2.584 28.549 4.555 6.833 16.417 -0.186
[0.13] [2.10]** [0.51] [0.33] [1.21] [0.02]
Lack of banking freedom -25.159 -20.695 -10.679 -27.706 -17.751 -12.38
[2.47]** [2.76]*** [2.20]** [2.70]*** [2.47]** [2.59]**
Restrictions on foreign currency lending -10.624 3.195 6.231 -10.931 11.264 6.109
[0.67] [0.25] [0.80] [0.65] [0.90] [0.78]
Inflation -0.003 -0.514 -0.231 0.047 -0.245 -0.193
[0.01] [1.45] [1.78]* [0.18] [0.68] [1.47]
Real GDP growth 0.549 -2.615 0.644 0.114 1.142 0.231
[0.13] [0.80] [0.34] [0.03] [0.34] [0.12]
Property righs 7.993 -0.902 8.041 17.413 0.676 8.966
[0.70] [0.10] [1.57] [1.56] [0.08] [1.78]*
Constant -472.093 -305.304 -280.08 -474.176 -399.861 -239.39
[2.80]*** [2.45]** [3.00]*** [2.70]*** [3.21]*** [2.97]***
Observations 76 73 79 86 79 88
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.195 0.069 0.096 0.181 0.066
Controlling for minimum capital Excluding minimum capital
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Table 6: Robustness tests on the determinants of the share of local to total foreign claims
Tobit regressions for the share of Italian, Spanish, and U.S. banks' local claims, respectively, vis-à-vis a given host (claim recipient country), 
divided by their total claims to that host. t-statistics are in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.
Variables
Italian 
banks
Spanish 
banks
U.S. 
banks
Italian 
banks
Spanish 
banks
U.S. 
banks
Italian 
banks
Spanish 
banks
U.S. 
banks
Non-capital entry requirements and startup costs -13.621 -5.28 -6.812 -1.308 3.14 -5.879 -3.321 1.728 -6.807
[1.76]* [1.17] [2.03]** [0.21] [0.70] [2.11]** [0.53] [0.39] [2.50]**
Bilateral distance -7.991 -16.953 -2.457 -19.552 -9.774 2.852 -20.004 -8.441 5.413
[0.97] [2.45]** [0.29] [2.59]** [1.41] [0.36] [2.76]*** [1.23] [0.71]
Bilateral trade -9.333 -3.724 -1.263 -8.91 -3.072 0.494 -11.812 -4.182 10.392
[1.43] [0.78] [0.17] [1.18] [0.69] [0.07] [1.41] [0.97] [1.25]
Common language 94.626 -1.894 74.667 2.31 55.559 0.449
[5.02]*** [0.23] [4.73]*** [0.34] [3.02]*** [0.07]
Common legal origin 33.076 38.842 21.952 2.95 31.347 19.206 0.488 22.36 16.734
[1.93]* [3.49]*** [2.38]** [0.20] [2.61]** [2.39]** [0.03] [2.11]** [2.17]**
Number of internet hosts -0.109 0.008 -0.073 -0.09 -0.032 -0.078 -0.091 -0.041 -0.08
[2.40]** [0.29] [2.54]** [1.77]* [0.96] [2.99]*** [1.81]* [1.20] [3.14]***
Log of GDP 30.93 17.727 9.284 23.492 18.981 9.026 27.733 15.44 12.989
[3.54]*** [3.03]*** [2.99]*** [3.59]*** [4.53]*** [4.12]*** [3.36]*** [2.89]*** [4.94]***
Corporate tax rate -3.207 -0.159 0.151 -1.697 -0.45 -0.489 -2.06 -0.328 -0.523
[3.16]*** [0.22] [0.30] [2.18]** [0.72] [1.30] [2.43]** [0.54] [1.37]
Restrictions on foreign credits 23.809 38.23 -1.445 14.38 23.215 -1.72 6.865 18.698 -1.489
[1.09] [2.71]** [0.13] [0.73] [1.62] [0.20] [0.33] [1.47] [0.17]
Lack of banking freedom -22.145 -16.692 -8.424 -26.438 -19.894 -12.867
[2.23]** [2.42]** [1.86]* [2.48]** [2.84]*** [2.73]***
Proportion of foreign bank applications denied -119.599 -56.757 0.896
[2.96]*** [3.52]*** [0.10]
Restrictions on foreign currency lending -22.761 9.024 0.715 -7.502 11.137 7.452 -9.89 4.45 6.558
[1.12] [0.59] [0.07] [0.45] [0.90] [0.93] [0.58] [0.36] [0.85]
Inflation 0.608 -0.107 -0.309 0.041 -0.22 -0.21
[1.39] [0.20] [1.31] [0.16] [0.68] [1.60]
Real GDP growth 1.869 4.045 -0.487 -0.147 -0.293 -0.276
[0.45] [1.29] [0.21] [0.04] [0.09] [0.15]
Property righs 1.343 0.775 5.458 15.979 -0.473 8.188
[0.10] [0.09] [0.95] [1.38] [0.06] [1.65]
Country risk 0.175 -1.212 0.194
[0.18] [1.65] [0.44]
Total foreign claims 0.000 0.001 -0.001
[0.40] [1.80]* [1.91]*
Constant -614.906 -351.975 -189.716 -319.382 -470.825 -167.329 -444.721 -282.523 -300.124
[3.03]*** [2.54]** [2.02]** [2.29]** [4.03]*** [2.34]** [2.38]** [2.24]** [3.49]***
Observations 57 51 60 85 79 86 86 79 88
Including foreign applications denied Including country risk Including total foreign claims
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Table 7: The impact of the share of Italian banks' local foreign claims on the volatility of Italian banks' total foreign claims
OLS regressions of the volatility of Italian banks' foreign claims across host (claim recipient) countries.  t-statistics are in brackets
 *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively
No controls
Share of local foreign claims -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
[3.05]*** [2.98]*** [2.90]*** [2.62]** [2.56]** [2.48]** [2.45]**
Inflation volatility 0.001 0.001 0.001
[1.68]* [1.68]* [0.62]
Real growth volatility -0.019 -0.02 -0.031
[0.50] [0.51] [0.83]
Country risk index 0.017 0.017 0.012
[3.03]*** [3.03]*** [1.61]
Banking crisis dummy 0.139 0.141 0.068 0.014 0.014 0.008
[1.00] [1.01] [0.49] [0.11] [0.11] [0.07]
Volatility of claims to other countries -38.607 -44.619 -45.778 -44.656
[1.05] [0.99] [1.30] [1.04]
Private Credit to GDP -0.005 -0.002
[3.06]*** [1.29]
Constant 0.554 0.531 0.963 1.289 1.759 2.277 1.98
[7.70]*** [4.81]*** [2.15]** [2.39]** [3.89]*** [3.64]*** [2.74]***
Observations 83 83 83 83 82 82 82
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17
Including inflation and growth volatility Including country risk index
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Table 8: The impact of the share of Spanish banks' local foreign claims on the volatility of Spanish banks' total foreign claims
OLS regressions of the volatility of Spanish banks' foreign claims across host (claim recipient) countries.  t-statistics are in brackets
 *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively
No controls
Share of local foreign claims -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[2.92]*** [2.71]*** [2.82]*** [2.76]*** [3.00]*** [3.15]*** [2.98]***
Inflation volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.07] [0.08] [0.19]
Real growth volatility 0.051 0.051 0.048
[1.90]* [1.89]* [1.83]*
Country risk index 0.005 0.006 0.003
[0.93] [0.97] [0.55]
Banking crisis dummy -0.035 -0.04 -0.051 -0.001 -0.012 -0.01
[0.36] [0.40] [0.47] [0.00] [0.10] [0.09]
Volatility of claims to other countries -4.058 -3.501 -6.227 -4.781
[0.76] [0.66] [1.02] [0.76]
Private Credit to GDP -0.001 -0.001
[0.73] [0.67]
Constant 0.421 0.29 0.483 0.515 0.785 1.122 0.93
[8.16]*** [5.26]*** [1.83]* [1.80]* [1.72]* [1.60] [1.33]
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.08
Including inflation and growth volatility Including country risk index
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Table 9: The impact of the share of U.S. banks' local foreign claims on the volatility of U.S. banks' total foreign claims
OLS regressions of the volatility of U.S. banks' foreign claims across host (claim recipient) countries.  t-statistics are in brackets
*, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively
No controls
Share of local foreign claims -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
[4.36]*** [4.36]*** [4.74]*** [4.12]*** [4.49]*** [4.44]*** [3.93]***
Inflation volatility 0.000 0.000 -0.001
[0.39] [0.60] [1.01]
Real growth volatility 0.055 0.046 0.046
[2.75]*** [2.14]** [2.31]**
Country risk index 0.01 0.008 0.004
[2.96]*** [1.41] [0.71]
Banking crisis dummy 0.06 0.036 0.01 0.053 0.045 0.039
[0.99] [0.61] [0.16] [0.81] [0.69] [0.61]
Volatility of claims to other countries 4.559 2.097 2.715 1.553
[2.21]** [0.80] [0.80] [0.46]
Private Credit to GDP -0.002 -0.002
[2.53]** [1.76]*
Constant 0.527 0.364 0.208 0.408 1.245 0.965 0.836
[8.18]*** [5.99]*** [2.64]*** [2.95]*** [4.44]*** [1.76]* [1.51]
Observations 87 87 87 87 85 85 85
R-squared 0.2 0.32 0.36 0.4 0.32 0.33 0.35
Including inflation and growth volatility Including country risk index
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